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By mixing together inequalities based on cyclical variables, such as unemploy-
ment, and on structural variables, such as education, usual measurements of
income inequality add objects of a di⁄erent economic nature. Since jobs are
not acquired or lost as fast as education or skills, this aggreagation leads to
a loss of relavant economic information. Here I propose a di⁄erent procedure
for the calculation of inequality. The procedure uses economic theory to con-
struct an inequality measure of a long-run character, the calculation of which
can be performed, though, with just one set of cross-sectional observations.
Technically, the procedure is based on the uniqueness of the invariant distri-
bution of wage o⁄ers in a job-search model. Workers should be pre-grouped
by the distribution of wage o⁄ers they see, and only between-group inequal-
ities should be considered. This construction incorporates the fact that the
average wages of all workers in the same group tend to be equalized by the
continuous turnover in the job market.1 Introduction
Several works in the literature have documented, from an empirical per-
spective, a positive correlation between income inequality and the rate of
unemployment. Mirer (1973), Beach (1977), Budd and Whiteman (1978),
Blinder and Esaki (1978), Nolan (1986), Cardoso (1993) and Cardoso et alli
(1995) are examples of this type. Elsewhere [Cysne (2004)]; I have used a
job-search model to provide a framework under which such a correlation can
be understood from a theoretical perspective as well.
The point I want to make here is of a normative nature. Usual mea-
surements of inequality, by also re￿ ecting a variable that is typically of a
cyclical nature, the rate of unemployment, most of the times do not corre-
spond to the underlying economic idea that one associates with an inequality
measure: that of structural imbalances in a society. Imbalances like those de-
termined, e.g., by an heterogeneity in the distributions of education or skills.
By mixing together short-run and long-run determinants of inequality, such
measurements lead to a loss of valuable information. Education and skills
are not acquired or lost as fast as jobs.
Allowing the measures of inequality to re￿ ect changes in the unemploy-
ment rate can lead to severe variations of this measure in the short run. Take
for instance the following conclusion in Cardoso (1993. p.112), based on the
observation of the evolution of indices of inequality in Brazil, in the 80s1:
"income distribution can change dramatically in one year". One of the two
main variables found by this author to explain the documented change of
inequality was exactly the rate of unemployment (the other was in￿ ation).
Such short-term variations can lead to misleading conclusions, mostly (for
obvious reasons) when one compares cross-section data of di⁄erent countries.
One way of freeing the statistic of such noises, for the purpose of making
comparisons among countries, is the one followed e.g., by Blinder and Esaki
(1978), Cardoso (1993) and Cardoso et alli (1995). These authors used a
time series of observations of income inequalities to regress it on unemploy-
ment and some other variables of a macroeconomic nature. Based on that
they were able to assess how much of the inequality could be attributed to
short run variations, and how much to structural factors. The method I pro-
pose here, though, by making an inference based on economic theory, can
achieve an equivalent result with just one set of cross-sectional observations
of income.
To further illustrate the argument, let￿ s think in terms of the usual
between-group (subscript b) and within-group (subscript w) decomposition
1This was a period of remarkable macroeconomic volatility in Brazil.
1allowed by the Theil (T) index of inequality2:
T = Tb + Tw (1)
Imagine an economy composed N di⁄erent classes (or groups) of homogenous
workers. One can think of this economy as a small economy, in which workers
are employed by a foreign ￿rm. Suppose, to simplify the argument, that
workers belong to the same class if and only if they face the same distribution
of wage o⁄ers, and that there is no overlapping (each worker belongs to only
one class). In practical terms, this is to say that the N di⁄erent classes are
supposed to di⁄er by structural parameters such as the level of education or
skills of the workers, rather than by economic variables that are short run or
cyclical by nature. As a practical problem, imagine that a researcher gathers
income data from the entire population of workers in this economy, in order
to measure its degree of income inequality3.
In each of the N subgroups of homogenous workers, the available data will
re￿ ect the fact that some (workers) have just been laid o⁄, some others have
been laid o⁄last period and have not found a job o⁄er this period, others are
unemployed because they have found an o⁄er but have turned it down (using
the usual terminology, because the o⁄er was below their reservation wage),
while, ￿nally, others are employed, but with di⁄erent wages (distributed in
the whole range between the reservation wage and the upper bound of the
distribution of wage o⁄ers).
The point to note, here, is that the cross-sectional data gathered by the
researcher will necessarily include a dispersion of wages in each one of the
2Note that the point I want to make here applies to all statistical indices of income
inequality, there being no particular connection with the Theil index. The nature of the
point is economic, rather than statistic. Among the measures of inequality, some are de-
composable, some are not. A decomposable inequality measure is a measure that can be
broken down into a weighted average of inequalities within subgroups of the population
and the inequality existing among those groups. Theil￿ s coe¢ cient is an example of a de-
composable measure (see Bourguignon (1979)), whereas the Gini coe¢ cient is an example
of a measure which is not decomposable. The fact that a measure is not decomposable,
though, does not mean that the overall inequality cannot be expressed as a sum of parts,
including a within-group and a between-group inequality. Pyatt (1976) and Yao (1999)
have shown, for instance, that the Gini coe¢ cient can be decomposed into a within-group,
between-group and a residual overlapping inequality, each term being necessarily nonneg-
ative.
3I assume throughout the whole paper that the only source of income of each
worker/consumer is the wage income. Transfers and capital income usually represent only
a small fraction of most households￿total income. For the United States, for instance,
following the 1992 SCF (Survey of Consumer Finances), transfers and capital income ac-
count in average for only around 28% of the total income of the households surveyed. This
percentage tends to be even lower in developing countries.
2di⁄erent subgroups. This will make Tw > 0 and positively correlated with
the rate of unemployment [Cysne(2004)], even though, as we shall fromalize
in this paper, Tw = 0 in a long-run measure that takes into consideration the
turnover in the job market.
Indeed, each group is composed of homogenous workers, regarding the
distribution of wage o⁄ers they see. This implies that, in the long run,
given the fact that such workers alternate their positions along the employ-
ment/unemployment cycle, there should be no reason for the average wage
of workers in the same group to di⁄er. The inherent inequality within each
class (Tw) is, by these means, of a temporary nature, economically di⁄erent
of the inequality among workers in di⁄erent classes (Tb).
Under the usual procedure used to calculate inequality measurements,
though, this fact (that the turnover in the job market tends to equalize
workers belonging to the same group) is not taken into consideration. The
normative point made here is that it makes sense to calculate inequalities
taking this point into consideration. When this is not done, temporary in-
equalities among workers of the same group (Tw), which tend to generate
(most of the times) an undesirable dependence of the overall inequality (T)
upon temporary cycles of aggregate unemployment (implying volatility), but
which tend to disappear in the medium or in the long run, are treated in the
same way as more relevant and permanent inequalities, like those generated
by the distribution of education (captured by Tb).
This type of concern about short-run and structural inequalities is not
something new. It represents, indeed, one of the main reasons why so many
empirical studies concentrate on the evaluation of how much of some mea-
surements of inequality can be attributed to unemployment, as opposed to
variables of a more structural nature.
Instead of having researchers measuring inequality adding apples (let￿ s
say, inequality explained by structural variables) and oranges (inequality ex-
plained by cyclical variables), and other researchers (like in the works men-
tioned above) sharing the burden of disentangling the sum or the parts, more
reasonable, it seems to me, would be asking the ￿rst group not to add apples
and oranges.
Most of this paper is dedicated to illustrate that, given the way how
we have proposed to construct the di⁄erent classes of workers, the within-
group inequality turns out to be spurious in the long run. From a technical
perspective, this is proved in terms of the existence of a unique invariant
distribution of wages for any worker in the economy4.
4This distribution also happens to be the cross-sectional distribution of wages in the
economy, translating a point-in-time dispersion of incomes within each group. This inter-
3The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model, proves
the uniqueness of the invariant distribution of wages, the convergence of
the sequence of probability measures de￿ned by the transition function of
the underlying Markov process, and derives the invariant distribution. A
counter-example is provided to show that the convergence of the sequence
of probability measures de￿ned by the Markov operator associated with the
job-search problem is not trivial. Section 3 is used to propose a measure of
income inequality which does not include within-group inequalities caused
by the turnover in the job market. A second example is provided, this time
to illustrate the method. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
The basic framework used here is a variation of McCall￿ s (1970) job-search
model. The presentation, as in Cysne (2004), follows the approach to this
model o⁄ered in Stokey and Lucas (1989), with the additional feature of
allowing for the possibility that, in each period, a worker does not receive a
job o⁄er.
Consider one class of workers facing a distribution of job o⁄ers. Suppose
that these o⁄ers are governed by the distribution function Fw, with support
in [0;D]; 0 < D < 1: Imagine that each worker in this class in involved
in a job search, the states of which are given by ￿ w" and sate ￿ 0": State w
corresponds to a job o⁄er of w at hand, and state 0 to no job o⁄er. In state w
the worker can accept or turn down the o⁄er. If he accepts it, by assumption
he stays employed with that wage till he is laid o⁄, which can happen, in
each period, with probability ￿: If he does not accept the o⁄er or if he gets
no o⁄er, he remains in state 0: Being in state zero the only thing he can do is
wait again for a job o⁄er next period, which happens with probability 1￿￿:
Assume that:
0 < ￿ < 1 (2)
0 < ￿ < 1
Note that the set in which we allow ￿ and ￿ to take values is very rea-
sonable from an economic perspective.
The individual is not allowed to search while in the job. Going to the job
market again requires ￿rst quitting the job and then waiting for a new o⁄er
pretation was the one used in Cysne (2004), in order to study the link between the rate
of unemployment and the usual measurements of income inequality.
4next period, which can be easily proved to make this option valueless. The








; 0 < ￿ < 1
With v(w) stating for the value function, and A, R; respectively, for
"accept" and "reject", the recursive version of the consumer￿ s problem is
given by the maximization of:
v(w) = max
A,R



















The solution type of problem is given in terms of a reservation wage, above
which the worker accepts the o⁄er, and below which the worker turns it
down. In this case the reservation wage, ￿ w; equals:
￿ w =
￿(1 ￿ ￿)




0 ￿ ￿ w)dFw(w
0) (4)
The analysis as of this point follows very closely Stokey and Lucas (1989,
c. 10 and 11), as well as Cysne (2004).
The reservation wage ￿ w(j) divides [0;D] into two regions: the acceptance
region A = [ ￿ w;D] and the non-acceptance region Ac = [0; ￿ w]: Consider a new
measurable space ([0;D],B[0;D];mo). mo is a measure of the wage o⁄ers of a
certain worker in the economy5. Denote by mot its expression at time t: At
each time t; mo is determined by its initial value and by a transition function
P : [0;D] ￿ B[0;D] ! [0;1] (see (5) below) which, in turn, depends upon the
rules of the job search process. The transition function P is determined in
the following way: If the current state (given by the wage o⁄er) is w 2 Ac,
5It di⁄ers of the measure determined by Fw by taking into consideration the rules of
the job search.
5the probability of having an o⁄er next period in any borelian B ￿ [0;D] is
(1 ￿ ￿)q(B) + ￿, if 0 2 B; and (1 ￿ ￿)q(B) if 0 = 2 B:
Alternatively, if the current state is w 2 A; by the rules of the problem the
worker can only lose his job (with probability ￿) or keep the same wage next
period. Therefore, with probability zero he will have a wage next period in a
borelian B that does not contain neither 0 or w: If the borelian B contains 0;
but not w; or w but not zero, the transition probabilities are, respectively, ￿
and 1￿￿: If it contains both, since these are disjoint events (because 0 = 2 A),
P(w;B) = 1.
This transition function implies that [0;D] is the only ergodic set of the




Denote by ￿([0;D];B[0;D]) the set of probability measures in ([0;D];B[0;D]).
In the extension of this space given by the (vector) space of signed measures,




with the supremum above being considered among all ￿nite partitions of
[0;D]: (6) de￿nes a metric on the space ￿([0;D];B[0;D]). This space, when
endowed with the norm k:k de￿ned by (6); is a complete metric space. De￿ne
in this space the operator T ￿ by:
T
￿(mo(t))(B) = mo(t+1)(B); B 2 B[0;D]
In order to talk about an invariant distribution of wages under this setting, it
is necessary to show that the distribution of wage o⁄ers has one ￿xed point
(called the invariant distribution) under the operator T ￿: To calculate the
invariant distribution we will have (before we take limits) to use the fact
that the sequence of probability measures T ￿N(mo(0)); N 2 N, converges
under the total variation norm.
For the demonstration of these two important points it su¢ ces proving
that, for some N ￿ 1; T ￿N is a contraction in the metric space ￿([0;D],B[0;D])6.
Indeed, since ￿([0;D],B[0;D]) is a complete metric space, if T ￿N can be shown
to be a contraction, by the N-stage contraction theorem (Corollary 2 of the-
orem 3.2 in Stokey and Lucas), T ￿ admits one and only one ￿xed point in
￿([0;D],B[0;D]).
6See Theorem 11.12 in Stokey and Lucas (1989).
6Proving that T ￿N is a contraction, therefore, is the only thing we have
to do here. This can be easily done with the help of Lemma 11.11 in Stokey
and Lucas (1989). Following these results, for T ￿N to be a contraction in
￿([0;D],B[0;D]) it su¢ ces to show that there exists a point w0 2 [0;D]; an
integer N ￿ 1; and a number ￿ > 0; such that P N(w;fw0g) > ￿ for all
w 2 [0;D]:
Proposition 1 The adjoint operator T ￿ of the transition function P de￿ned
above has one and only one unique ￿xed point. This ￿xed point is the invari-
ant measure of wage o⁄ers de￿ned in ([0;D],B[0;D]) by (5).
Proof. Take N = 1 and w0 = 0: From what we saw about the transition
function P, there are two cases to consider: if w 2 A = [ ￿ w;D], P(w;fw0g) =





Then, ￿ > 0 by (2) and P N(w;fw0g) = P(w;f0g) > ￿; all w 2 [0;D]: This
proves that T ￿N is a contraction. The result then follows from the N-stage
contraction theorem. The second assertion follows by de￿nition.
The convergence of T ￿N can fail if (2) is not explicitly required.
Example 1 Suppose that the measure given by F concentrates all of its mass
in a point w1 2 [0;D]; that ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1: Note that such assumptions
violate condition (2) above. Note, also, that the demonstration of Proposition
1 used the fact that ￿ > 0: In this case, the reservation wage is trivially equal
to w1: Therefore, there are only two states, f0g and fw1g; which alternate






which satis￿es A = A3 = A5::: and I2x2 = A2 = A4 = :::;I2x2 denoting
the 2x2 identity matrix. Of course, T ￿N = AN does not converge in this
case. There is one invariant distribution, though, which places mass 1=2 at
point f0g and mass 1=2 in point fw1g: f0;w1g; the only ergodic set, has two
cyclically moving subsets, f0g and fw1g.
After proving the uniqueness of the invariant measure of wage o⁄ers in
Proposition 1, the next step is calculating this distribution. Stokey and Lucas
(1989) do a particular case in which ￿ = 0: I make a similar development
here. Note that, for any C ￿ A:
mot+1(C) = mot(A
c)(1 ￿ ￿)mw(C) + mot(C)(1 ￿ ￿) (7)
7The determination of the invariant measure mo(C) = limt!1mot(C) requires
proving the existence of this limit, which has already been done in Proposition
1, as well as the calculation of mot(Ac): To proceed with this second step note
that, since a worker is unemployed in period t+1 if and only if he was already





c) + ￿] + mot(A)￿ (8a)
Taking limits, equation (8a) trivially implies mo(Ac) = ￿=[￿ + mw(1 ￿ ￿)]:




￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)mw(A)
Make fp(s)ds represent the number of people earning income in the range
(s;s+ds): Taking into consideration that all wage o⁄ers in Ac imply a wage






￿+(1￿￿)mw(A) if s = 0
(1￿￿)dFw(s)
￿+(1￿￿)mw(A) if ￿ w ￿ s < D
(9)





￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)mw(A)
(10)
where ￿ w follows from (4).
3 An Alternative Measure of Income Inequal-
ity
Now, let￿ s go back to our researcher trying to measure the degree of income
inequality in an economy in which there are N di⁄erent groups of homo-
geneous workers. Suppose that the researcher collects the income data of
each group, separately, and uses the Theil coe¢ cient to calculate the within-
group and the between-group inequalities. Then the usual measure reads:
T = Tw + Tb; with Tw > 0 and Tb > 0: Under the invariant distribution,
though, Tw = 0: Assuming that the long-run measure (T = Tb) is the correct
one, under a certain situation, the usual procedure then leads to a bias given
by Tw: Cysne (2004) has shown that this bias can be expected to increase
when unemployemt increases. Proposition 2 sums up the point I want to
make and example 2 illustrates it:
8Proposition 2 Suppose all workers in this economy have been pre-grouped
in terms of the distribution of wage o⁄ers they see, when looking for a job
and that there are N of such homogenous-workers groups. Then, under a
long-run perspective, only the between-group inequality should be used for the
purpose of the calculation of a measure of inequality for the economy.
Proof. By (10), under the invariant distribution, the average wage of






Example 2 Suppose N = 2 (two groups of homogeneous workers). Let￿ s
assume that, in the ￿rst group, the distribution Fw is given by the uniform
distribution in [0;1]: Just to make the point that the claim made here does
not depend upon any speci￿c meausure of inequality, let￿ s work this time with
the Gini coe¢ cient of income inequality (insted of the Theil index). Given





0; 0 ￿ j < ￿
￿+(1￿￿)(1￿ ￿ w)
[




(1￿ ￿ w2) ; ￿
￿+(1￿￿)(1￿ ￿ w) ￿ j ￿ 1
(11)
The are under the Lorenz curve is then given by:
U =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ 3￿ w2 + 2￿ w3)









1 ￿ ￿￿ + ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿
)2 ￿ 1 (13)
One can then obtain a closed-form solution to the Gini coe¢ cient (G) by
using (13) in (12) and the de￿nition: G = 1 ￿ 2U: This is the within-group
inequality in group 1. Note that the within-group Gini coe¢ cient is an in-
creasing function of both theta and alpha, the same happening with the rate
of unemployment, ￿
￿+(1￿￿)(1￿ ￿ w) . As pointed out by Cysne (2004), this can
explain the positive correlation between unemployment and inequality many
times documented by the empirical literature.
Now let￿ s turn our attention to the second group. To simplify the point I
want to make, without the need of resorting to further calculations, suppose
9that in this second group ￿ = ￿ = 0 and all the mass of the distribution of
wage o⁄ers is concentrated on the average wage of the ￿rst group.
Then, under the long-run measure here proposed, the long-run inequality
in this economy as a whole, considering the two groups, should be equal to
zero, because under the respective invariant distributions (in the second case,
with mass one in one single point), both groups have the same average wage,
and in each group all workers will have the same wage as well.
However, the data collected by the researcher will necessarily show some
workers with income equal to zero (since ￿ 6= 0 in the ￿rst group) and some
others with a positive wage (since the average wage of group one is strictly
positive). Therefore, the overall income inequality calculated by the researcher
will be strictly positive, even though all workers are homogenous from a long-
run perspective. Moreover, as we have seen above, such a bias between the
usual measurement and our desired long-run-measure will be positively cor-
related with (and as volatile as) the rate of unemployemt.
Note that the procedure here detailed, considering the way how the work-
ers are grouped, uses the inference provided by economic theory to allow for
the derivation of a measure of income inequality that has characteristics of a
long-run measure, but can be calculated using only one set of cross sectional
data.
Under our assumptions, the way of calculating the long-run measure of
inequality would simply involve: i) classifying the consumers in N di⁄erent
groups, by the distribution of wage o⁄ers they face and; ii) using the aver-
age wage in each one of these N groups to construct a N-point measure of
inequality.
4 Conclusions
In this paper I have argued that inequality measures should distinguish be-
tween inequalities based on cyclical variables, such as unemployment, and
inequalities based on structural variables, such as education. In order to ob-
tain an inequality freed from cyclical variations caused by unemployment, but
at the same time feasible to be calculated with only one set of cross-sectional
data, I have proposed that workers be pre-grouped by the distribution of
wage o⁄ers they face, and that only between-group inequality be considered.
Example 2 was used to illustrate the method.
Technically speaking, the proposal is based on the existence and unique-
ness of a convergent measure of wages within anyone of such groups, under
which all workers are equal in the long run. The underlying economic fact
10is that the average wage of all workers in each group is equalized by the
continuous turnover in the job market.
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